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Summary: An important challenge associated with driving simulation 
development is the computational representation of agent behaviors. This paper 
describes the development of a preliminary autonomous agent behavior model 
(based on the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model, and Hintzman’s 
multiple-trace memory model) mimicking human decision making in approaching 
an intersection controlled by a traffic light. To populate the model, an initial 
Cognitive Task Analysis was conducted with six drivers to learn the important 
cues, expectancies, goals, and courses of action associated with traffic light 
approach. The agent model learns to associate environmental cues (such as traffic 
light color) with expectancies of upcoming events (like light color change) and 
appropriate courses of action (such as decelerating). At present, the model is 
currently being evaluated for its successful representation of the Recognition-
Primed Decision Making process. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The computational representation of agent behavior is an important challenge associated with 
driving simulation development. Although agent behavior may be scripted for a specific 
simulation run, this constrains the level of dynamic interaction a subject may experience within 
the virtual world. An alternative is the creation of autonomous, intelligent agents within the 
environmental model. This permits dynamic interactions with the subject, however, the agent 
behavior may or may not effectively mimic human behavior and thus presents an unrealistic 
driving environment. To adequately mimic driver behavior, the agent model must be based on 
both empirical data and a theory of human performance while driving. In this paper, a 
preliminary computational model of autonomous agent behavior in approaching an intersection 
controlled by a traffic light is presented, based on an applied theory of decision making known as 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) (Klein, 1998; Klein, 1989). This computational model, 
although preliminary, is a step towards the development of more autonomous, human-like agents 
in a simulation environment. 
 
The paper begins with a description of RPD, a model of the expert’s decision-making process. 
Next, a Cognitive Task Analysis is described. The Cognitive Task Analysis was conducted to 
populate the key features of a computational recognition-primed decision making model during 
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the approach to an intersection controlled by a traffic light. Finally, a computational agent model, 
which mimics some aspects of a human’s behavior when approaching a traffic light, is explained. 
 
RECOGNITION-PRIMED DECISION MAKING 
 
Recognition-primed decision making is a phenomelogical description of how expert performers 
make decisions in situations characterized by time constraints, uncertainty, and high stakes. The 
RPD model originally grew out of the interviews and observations of firefighter commanders 
confronting real-life fires (Calderwood, Crandall, & Klein, 1987) and has since been developed 
and demonstrated in over 50 domains such as driver route planning (Hutton, Thordsen, Militello, 
& Heaton, 1995), computer hackers and security experts (McCloskey, Stanard, & Armstrong, 
2001), weather forecasters, and neonatal intensive care nurses (Klein, 1998).  
 
In routine situations (RPD Variation 1: Simple 
Match), the expert experiences the world in a 
dynamic context and comes to recognize a 
situation as typical. Typicality has four 
components associated with it: relevant cues for 
that situation, expectancies, plausible goals, and 
plausible courses of action. Once the situation is 
recognized as familiar, a single course of action 
is obvious and is implemented. This basic 
process contrasts with rational-choice models of 
decision making, where several action 
alternatives are generated and the relative merits 
of each are evaluated before one is selected and 
executed. 
 
 
Figure 1. Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model, Variation 2.  
 
Figure 1 shows RPD Variation 2: Diagnose the situation. Sometimes, the decision maker 
engages in more deliberate diagnosis because the situation is not immediately recognized, and 
information is actively sought to find cues and features that bring to light the nature or type of 
situation. In other cases, the situation type may initially be recognized, but incorrectly. As events 
pan out, expectancies of future events are violated and the decision maker seeks clarification of 
the situation through the diagnostic process. Feature matching and storybuilding are two 
common processes for diagnosing a situation.  
 
COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS 
 
Variations 1 and 2 of the RPD model were applied towards the development of a preliminary 
driver decision-making process and computational model. A limited Cognitive Task Analysis 
study was conducted to populate the elements of the model in the context of an approach to a 
traffic light.  
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Cognitive Task Analysis is a set of qualitative interviewing and observational methods used to 
uncover the cognitive expertise associated with a complex task. Typically, Cognitive Task 
Analysis uncovers important information associated with a task, strategies for making sense of 
data, cognitive challenges, and novice errors. In this study, we conducted individual, one-hour 
interviews with four drivers having a minimum of two years driving experience (“experts”), and 
two drivers with less than two years experience (“novices”). The interview focused on general 
and specific issues surrounding decision making while approaching an intersection controlled by 
a traffic light, including: 
 
• Prominent cues and environmental factors that the driver attends to 
• Expectancies that are formed 
• “Red flags” that signal something is amiss 
• Goals that the driver may be trying to achieve or balance 
• Courses of action that may be followed 
 
Table 1 below lists the major goals, cues, expectancies, and courses of actions that participants 
reported. One limitation in this format is that cues and expectancies are often not easily 
expressed verbally, but rather are perceptual quantities difficult to articulate in a few descriptive 
words. The interview results were then compiled into mappings of the goals, cues, and 
expectancies onto courses of action. Not all mappings were directly drawn from the interview 
data—many mappings were created based on research team members’ understanding of driving.  
 
An important finding from the driver interviews not described in the table is the “point of no 
return” (PONR). Some participants reported that there is a point in the approach to the traffic 
light when a decision has to be made to go or stop. This likely conforms to a minimum safe 
stopping distance, which is a function of approach speed, road conditions, brake performance, 
reaction time, etc. If the driver nears the PONR, the decision must be made to stop immediately 
or go. Crossing the PONR means the driver has no choice but to go (or risk stopping within the 
intersection).  
 
Table 1  
Components of the Decision-making Context at an Intersection Controlled by a Traffic Light 
 
Goals Cues Expectancies Course of Action 
- Don’t break the law 
- Don’t get caught 
- Don’t hit anything or be 
hit 
- Minimize drive time 
- Preserve momentum 
- Maintain traffic flow 
- Avoid sudden stops 
- Light Color 
- Distance to light 
- Auto speed 
- Presence of cop 
- Pedestrian presence 
- Presence of lead car 
- Presence of cross traffic 
 
Other vehicle actions: 
- Slowing lead 
- Turning on-coming 
- Turning cross traffic 
Lead car actions:  
- Going through light 
- Stopping 
- Not moving 
 
Light: 
- Going to change 
- Not going to change 
- Can’t make it before it changes 
- Pedestrian moving 
- Accelerate 
- Decelerate 
- Stop (controlled) 
- Stop (hard break) 
- Maintain speed 
- Change lanes 
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COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
 
A real-world driving environment encompasses a variety of subtle interactions between the 
driver and a dynamic situation. To facilitate the initial development of a working computational 
model, we decided to simplify the decision-making context. Selected cues, expectancies, and 
courses of action from Table 1 were included. Goals were not considered for the initial model, 
and some environmental factors such as pedestrians, lead vehicles, and turning traffic were not 
featured. One course of action (lane change) was also eliminated for the initial model 
development.   
 
Memory and Typicality  
 
Recognition-primed decision making is an abstract, qualitative model, and the transformation to 
a computational model presents a variety of challenges. It does not address all the cognitive 
structures supporting the decision-making process diagrammed in Figure 1. For instance, 
recognition-primed decision making assumes an experience base that the decision maker relies 
upon, but the model does not describe the Long Term Memory (LTM) store. It also posits a 
decision maker who recognizes a situation as typical, but the model does not describe how this 
typicality is formed from memory. These two issues of LTM and typicality are addressed using 
Hintzman’s multiple-trace memory model (Hintzman, 1986). Within the multiple-trace model, 
each experience of the agent is encoded as a unique trace in LTM. A multiple-trace memory is a 
collection of all the experience traces, rather than a store of experience types. Recognition is a 
process of comparing a given situation to each trace in memory, and producing a similarity value 
for the trace. The similarity values of all trace comparisons are combined and formed into an 
“echo” representing the typicality of the situation. 
 
Decision Cycle 
 
Figure 2 and labels A-D show how a single cycle of the computational driver model works in 
relation to the RPD model. The driver’s memory is a store of multiple experiences at the same 
intersection. During an episode, the driver approaches the intersection and initially samples the 
environment (A). The sampling strategy is determined probabilistically and includes cues such as 
traffic light color (green, yellow, red), relative distance to the light (PONR, Not PONR), cross-
traffic presence (yes, no), and law enforcement presence (yes, no). This constitutes the first phase 
Figure 2. Computational model of recognition-primed decision making at a traffic light intersection. 
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of RPD: “Experience the environment in changing context.” The environment sample is stored in 
short-term memory (STM) and used to “probe” LTM (B). Probing LTM consists of computing a 
similarity value between the contents of STM and each trace in LTM. These similarity values are 
used, in turn, to produce an echo that represents the weighted contribution of each trace in LTM 
to the components of typicality. One of these components is a set of four dichotomous 
expectancies (car is stopping, cross traffic is present, rear vehicle will be present, and light will 
change). Positive values indicate “yes,” negative values indicate “no” (C). The echo also 
indicates which of five different courses of action (go, stop, accelerate, decelerate, maintain 
speed) has been “recognized.” Recognition in this context includes some “off-line” statistical 
analysis to determine whether a single course of action has in fact been recognized and whether 
that course of action has been successful in past similar situations. The comparative process of 
probing LTM and returning an echo constitutes recognition in this model: “Is situation typical?” 
What are recognized expectancies for a given situation, and appropriate (or inappropriate) 
courses of action? 
 
At this point, the driver takes another sample of the current environment to confirm or invalidate 
the expectancies (E). If expectancies are met, the course of action is implemented and the results 
of that action are recorded; if the expectancies are violated, the driver reassesses the situation 
starting with a fresh set of cues from the environment (A) and another pass through the probe-
echo cycle. This constitutes “anomaly” and “clarify” in the RPD model (Klein, 1989). Once a 
course of action has been implemented (perhaps after several attempts at diagnosis), the results 
of that action are used to compute a measure of successfulness. The success measure is stored as 
a new trace in LTM, along with the cue values that prompted recognition and the cue values that 
were used to evaluate the expectancies.  
 
TEST BED ENVIRONMENT 
 
The agent model was created using Micro Saint, enhanced with a Visual Basic back end to 
implement LTM and the recognition and diagnosis routines. At present, the agent model is 
undergoing qualitative and quantitative tests to evaluate how successfully it mimics human 
decision-making behavior at an intersection, both in terms of decision-making product and 
process. 
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